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POLITICAL WILL AND THE .UNITARY 
EXECUTIVE: WHAT MAKES AN 
INDEPENDENT AGENCY 
INDEPENDENT? 
Neal Devins• 
The government does not speak a unitary voice in court. The 
exercise of independent litigating authority by governmental entities 
connotes the absence of White House authority and, with it, disunity 
in interpretation. Sometimes Congress encourages such disunity 
through statutory grants of independent litigating authority. Some-
times the executive accommodates the desires of governmental enti-
ties to speak their own voice in particular cases. At other times the 
executive acknowledges an implicit claim of right for an independent 
agency or governmental corporation to control its litigation. 
What then defines the line which separates that which is within 
the President's control from spheres of authority independent of the 
President's will? In a sense, this question puts the cart before the 
horse. It assumes that the power to implement the laws can be par-
celled out between the President and independent policy makers. 
This assumption is an anathema to and rejected by supporters of a 
unitary executive. 1 Nonetheless it is appropriate. The Supreme Court 
has never accepted and the Solicitor General has never advanced the 
strict unitariness claim. 2 Unitariness is not simply a theoretical con-
struct, the figment of someone's imagination. Quite the contrary, per-
ceptions about unitariness define ·White House control of the 
administrative state. The more the President constructively asserts 
• Professor of Law & Lecturer in Government at the College of William and Mary. I 
would like to thank Wendy Watson for her research assistance and insights; John McGinnis 
for his guidance; and attorneys who not only participated in the episodes recounted in this 
Article but also shared their thoughts with me. I was a consultant to the Postal Service in its 
battle with the White House-one of the stories discussed in' this Article. The views expressed 
on that and other disputes are solely those of the author. 
I See generally TERRY EASTLAND, ENERGY IN THE EXECUTIVE 161 (1992); DOUGLAS 
W. KMIEC, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S LAWYER 47-68 (1992); Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin 
H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. 
REV. 1155, 1166-69 (1992). 
2 See CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW 154-60 (1991); Bernard Schwartz, An Adminis-
trative Law "Might Have Been"-Chief Justice Burger's Bowsher v. Synar Draft, 42 ADMIN. L. 
REv. 221 (1990) (Justices' conference and draft opinions in Bowsher v. Synar reveal over-
whelming support for structural restrai~ts on President's power-so long as the execution of 
the law is n~t vested in another branch of government). 
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his Chief Executive status, the greater his power. Along the same 
lines, the more Congress or independent agencies perceive the Presi-
dent as the unitary head of government, the greater the President's 
power to control the administrative state. 
The above proposition seems little more than a restatement of the 
obvious. For the most part, however, analysis-at least by legal 
scholars-of the breadth and limitations of White House control over 
the administrative state has focused on whether or not Congress has 
imposed formal structural limits on executive control. 3 In particular, 
multimember agencies headed by commissioners who serve staggered 
terms and who are not removable at the executive's will are perceived 
as having the power to exert an independent voice which may run 
afoul of executive wishes. Examination of particular agencies, how-
ever, indicates that this analysis is overly simplistic. 
This Article suggests an alternative paradigm of agency indepen-
dence. The focus of agency analysis should encompass interbranch 
power and expectations as well as agency structure. Through an as-
sessment of the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC"), the 
United States Postal Service, and, in particular, the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), this paper argues that the 
traditional structural paradigm for determining an agency's independ-
ent power is inadequate. Examine the case of the EEOC: Despite 
staggered term Commissioners, for-cause removal, lead agency status 
in coordinating federal employment antidiscrimination efforts, and in-
dependent litigating authority, the Department of Justice-with 
White House backing-has successfully exerted extraordinary control 
over the EEOC. For example, in a controversial affirmative action 
case, the EEOC withdrew from filing an amicus brief counter to the 
Justice Department's position.4 
The EEOC example, as will be shown, does not suggest that 
structure is irrelevant. Structural limitations are significant, but not 
controlling. The willfulness of the President, the Congress, and the 
agency itself are equally as important. In the case of the EEOC, the 
executive forcefully exerted control over the agency while Congress, 
standing on the sidelines, acquiesced to this power grab. In contrast, 
the example of the FCC reveals how executive power can be delimited 
3 See generally Symposium, Separation of Powers and the Executive Branch: The Reagan 
Era in Retrospect, 57 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 401 (1989); Symposium, The Uneasy Constitutiqnal 
Status of the Administrative Agencies, 36 A,M. U. L. REV. 277 (1987). Cf EASTLAND, supra 
note 1, at 383-84 (advancing political strategies for unitariness). · 
4 See Williams v. City of New Orleans, 729 F.2d 1554, 1571 n.l (5th Cir. 1984). For 
further discussion, see infra part II.A.l. 
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by congressional and agency assertions of power. s Finally, the Postal 
Service calls attention to the necessity of strategic planning for the 
executive to effectively expand its power. 6 
This Article examines the paramount role of political actors in 
defining the unitariness of executive branch interpretations. Its spe-
cific focus is on Department of Justice control of independent agency 
litigation. This issue is of great symbolic and practical importance to 
the unitary executive debate. Clearly, "those who control the agenda 
will have great opportunity for manipulating the social choice."7 If 
the White House, through the Department of Justice, controls an 
agency's access to courts, it therefore controls the court's agenda for 
policy making; if an agency controls litigation, it will set its own 
agenda. 
This Article will examine the question of executive control over 
litigation in three phases. Part I will consider structural and political 
limitations to Department of Justice control of government litigation. 
Part II will examine the intersection between politics and structure 
through three case studies. Part II will first assess the Department of 
Justice's success in politically overcoming structural limitations to its 
authority by neutralizing EEOC independence. In making this assess-
ment, the role of Congress and the EEOC itself, in facilitating this 
Department of Justice initiative, will also be considered. Part II will 
then examine "turf wars" between the Department of Justice and two 
other independent agencies, the Postal Service and the FCC. This 
examination will provide insight into the ways in which structure and 
politics intersect when defining the line between executive unitariness 
and agency independence. Finally, part III will synthesize these case 
studies. This synthesis will highlight the limits of the structural para-
digm and the centrality of politics. 
I. THE DISUNITARY EXECUTIVE BRANCH 
Executive branch centralization is more illusory than real. The 
administrative state is far too immense for the White House, the Of-
fice of Management and Budget ("OMB"), and the Department of 
Justice to comprehensively coordinate policy making. In the area of 
civil rights, for example, every government agency, department, and 
s See infra part II.B.l. 
6 See infra part II.B.3. 
7 DAVID L. WEIMER & AIDAN VINING, POLICY ANALYSIS: CONCEPTS AND PRACfiCE 
115-16 (1992) (discussing policy implications of Arrow's General Possibility Theorem). For 
an insightful article on Justice Department control of litigation, see Susan M. Olson, Chal-
lenges to the Gatekeeper: The Debate Over Federal Litigation Authority, 68 JUDICATURE 71 
(1984). 
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commission is involved in enforcement. 8 Nondiscrimination in fed-
eral assistance requirements are enforced by all government agencies 
distributing federal largess; EEOC regulations call for sensitivity by 
all government entities to numerical equality objectives in their own 
hiring. Moreover, freestanding civil rights enforcement projects exist 
within the EEOC, FCC, Small Business Administration, Civil Rights 
Commission, Legal Services Corporation, and the Departments of 
Treasury, Labor, Education, Commerce, Transportation, and Justice. 
Given the pervasiveness of civil rights enforcement, centralization can 
occur only if the White House both makes coordination a primary 
objective and is extremely diligent in appointing to key government 
posts individuals who agree with the President's views on civil rights 
enforcement. Otherwise, competing regulatory goals will take prior-
ity to civil rights enforcement and, correlatively, external pressures 
from oversight committees and constituency interests will dilute the 
White House agenda. 9 
The apparent impossibility of centralization should not be 
equated with government run amok. An "energetic" President can 
place his imprimatur on governmental operations through both the 
appointment of like-minded individuals and the endorsement of hier-
archical Justice Department control of litigation, OMB control of reg-
ulation, and White House control of legislative initiatives. 10 
Congress, however, can erect roadblocks to centralization efforts. 
Threatened funding prQhibitions have hampered aggressive OMB 
oversight. 11 Statutory exceptions to Department of Justice litigation 
authority have likewise impeded Attorney General efforts to advocate 
a unitary executive voice. 
A. Structural Limits on Attorney General Control 
The authority of the Attorney General to manage government 
litigation is certainly the norm. When Congress established the De-
partment of Justice in 1870, it sought to secure "a unity of decision, a 
unity of jurisprudence ... in the executive law of the United States." 12 
8 Neal Devins, The Civil Rights Hydra, 89 MICH. L. REv. 1723, 1753 (1991). 
9 This is precisely what occurred in the battle over race preferences between the FCC and 
the Justice Department. See infra part II.B. 
10 For an analysis of the energetic President, see EASTLAND, supra note l, at 277-89; 
KMIEC, supra note l, at 47-48. On the pitfalls of an energetic President, see GEORGE C. EADS 
& MICHAEL FIX, RELIEF OR REFORM? (1984); THE REAGAN EXPERIMENT: AN EXAMINA· 
TION Of EcONOMie AND SOCIAL POLICIES UNDER THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION (John L. 
Palmer & Isabel V. Sawhill eds., 1982). 
II See Judith Havermann, "Defunding" OMB's Rule Reviewers; Hill Panel Deletes $5.4 
Million Budget, WASH. PoST, July 18, 1986, at Al7. 
12 CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3036 (1870). See generally Olson, supra note 7. See 
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The legislation authorizing the Justice Department set the stage for 
massive centralization of government litigation, specifying that 
"[e]xcept as otherwise authorized by law, the conduct of [govern-
ment] litigation ... is reserved to officers of the Department of Jus-
tice, under the direction of the Attorney General."13 Nevertheless, 
the initial caveat of this legislation ("[e]xcept as otherwise authorized 
by law") provided enough room for agency empowerment to keep 
alive the debate over the appropriate level of Department of Justice 
control. Indeed, Congress's power to make exceptions to Department 
of Justice control has severely infringed upon the Attorney General's 
role as chief litigator for the United States. That Congress would 
make such exceptions should come as no surprise. When Department 
of Justice centralization frustrates legislative desires, Congress may 
protect its prerogatives by transferring litigating authority to an 
agency or department that is more likely to endorse its preferences. 
Furthermore, legislative grants of independent litigating author-
ity result in a significant number of intragovernmental disputes that 
are publicly aired before federal courts, including the Supreme Court. 
Congressional exceptions to Department of Justice control, moreover, 
lack a coherent pattern. 14 Some entities have independent litigating 
authority on all matters before all courts (e.g., the Federal Election 
Commission, the Senate's Office of Legal Counsel, and special prose-
cutors appointed under the Ethics in Government Act); others have 
independent litigating authority on some matters before all courts 
(e.g., the Department of Agriculture and the Federal Trade Commis-
sion). Moreover, some entities have independent litigating authority 
on some matters before some courts (e.g., the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency and the Department of Health and Human Services); 
some have independent litigating authority on all matters before some 
courts (e.g., the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission, the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission, and the Internal Revenue Service); still others have in-
dependent litigating authority on some matters before all courts and 
on other matters before some courts (e.g., the Federal Communica-
also The Attorney General's Role as Chief Litigator for the United States [hereinafter Attor-
ney General as Chief Litigator], 6 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 47 (1982); Neal Devins, Unitariness 
and Independence: Solicitor General Control of Independent Agency Litigation, 81 CAL. L. 
REv. (forthcoming Dec. 1993). 
13 28 u.s.c. § 516 (1988). 
14 See Olson, supra note 7; Devins, supra note 12; THE OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN, AD-
MINISTRATIVE CoNFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, MULTI-MEMBER INDEPENDENT 
REGULATORY AGENCIES: A PRELIMINARY SURVEY OF THEIR ORGANIZATION (hereinafter 
PRELIMINARY SURVEY] (rev. ed. May 1992). 
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tions Commission and the Federal Maritime Commission). Intragov-
ernmental conflict therefore manifests itself in countless forms 
depending on the issue and the court. 
Independent litigating authority is not the death knell of Attor-
ney General control, however. Despite significant statutory excep-
tions, the vast majority <;>f government litigation is conducted by the 
Department of Justice. The Justice Department remains dominant 
because of the presumed benefits in the quality of representation, the 
cohesiveness of governmental arguments, and the bringing of a 
greater objectivity to representing the public interest. Grants of in-
dependent litigation authority nonetheless pose a severe structural 
barrier to Attorney General control, especially when litigating au-
thority is vested in independent agency heads-that is, officials who 
may only be dismissed by the President "for cause." Intuitively, ad-
ministrators and commissioners, secure in their offices, are better able 
to defy Executive wishes and assert independent authority. For-cause 
removal is controversial for precisely this reason; it envisions and 
thereby encourages agency heads to, at least occasionally, engage in 
policy disputes with the White House. At a most fundamental level, 
immunity froin removal grants administrators the freedom to speak 
with an independent voice. 15 
Focusing on these structural characteristics, however, places a 
heavy emphasis on the role of the executive in shaping agency deci-
sion making. The structural paradigm assumes executive control of 
federal agencies, and carves out exceptions for agencies with the pro-
cedural ability to ward off the executive. Moreover, the structural 
paradigm implies that agency independence can be determined by 
consulting a checklist of structural characteristics. 
The line separating agency independence from Department of 
Justice control, of course, is too murky for a checklist. Political insti-
tutions transcend their structural characteristics. Political will and 
varying circumstances play a critical role in determining whether gov-
ernment presents itself in court as a unitary voice or multiheaded 
hydra. 
B. The Problem of Political Will 
Fundamentally, the question of whether, and to what extent, 
Is As early as 193 7, political commentators warned of the threat posed to the unitary exec-
utive by independent agencies; the Brownlow Commission described the independent agency 
as a "headless 'fourth branch' of Government, a haphazard deposit of irresponsible agencies 
and uncoordinate powers." PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON ADMIN. MANAGEMENT, REPORT WITH 
SPECIAL STUDIES 37 (1937). 
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government will speak as a unitary voice in court is a question of 
representation-namely, do government lawyers litigate on behalf of 
Congress, the affected agency or department, or the President. The 
most prevalent model, the so-called bureaucratic theory of representa-
tion, envisions the affected agent or department as the policy-making 
client, and agency counsel or the Justice Department as the dutiful 
advocate. 16 Proponents of the unitary executive reject bureaucratic 
theories of representation and instead argue that the obligation of gov-
ernment attorneys "is most reasonably seen as runmng to the execu-
tive branch as a whole and to the President as its head., 17 Finally, to 
the extent that some governmental entities are viewed as "arms of the 
Congress,, the desires of oversight committees may figure promi-
nently in government representation. 18 
The choice of the representation model is a function of independ-
ent litigation authority, removal authority, and other structural at-
tributes. However, political will is the most significant factor in 
determining which representation model will predominate. Political 
will may manifest itself in several ways. The existence or nonexis-
tence of structural barriers to Justice Department control of litigation 
is a by-product of political will. On the one hand, the Nixon and 
Carter administrations signed off on the creation of independent liti-
gating authority in the Postal Service, the Federal Trade Commission, 
and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. 19 For these admin-
istrations, independent litigating authority outside the President's di-
rect control was of little consequence. The Reagan and Bush 
administrations, on the other hand, fought off congressional efforts to 
create new repositories of independent litigating authority.20 Reagan 
pocket vetoed the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1988 because it 
16 According to Susan Olson, the official position of the Justice Department "is that the 
Department does not make policy-that is the responsibility and right of the client agencies." 
Olson, supra note 7, at 82. For a detailed assessment of bureaucratic theory and its pitfalls, see 
John 0. McGinnis, Principle Versus Politics: The Solicitor General's Office in Constitutional 
and Bureaucratic Theory, 44 STAN. L. REV. 799 (1992). 
17 Geoffrey P. Miller, Government Lawyers' Ethics in a System of Checks and Balances, 54 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1293, 1298 (1987). 
18 For case studies involving House Energy and Commerce Committee oversight of the 
FCC, see Neal Devins, Congress, the FCC, and the Search for the Public Trustee, 56 LAw & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 1993). See also Mark C. Miller, Congress and the Constitu-
tion: A Tale of Two Committees (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
19 See Olson, supra note 7; SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, STUDY 
ON FEDERAL REGULATION, S. Doc. No. 95-91, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 61-62, 261-307 (1977). 
20 See generally KMIEC, supra note 1. Reagan, however, did sign legislation delegating 
executive branch power to the Comptroller General as part of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings 
Budget Deficit Act and to the independent counsel as part of the Ethics in Government Act. 
See LoUIS FISHER & NEAL DEVINS, POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 142-
60 (1992). 
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empowered a special counsel to obtain judicial review of Merit Sys-
tems Protection Board decisions, thereby undermining the President's 
"authority to supervise and resolve disputes between his subordi-
nates.''21 The Bush administration followed suit by objecting to a 
proposed Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight with in-
dependent litigating authority to be established within the Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development.22 
Political will also figures prominently in the President's manage-
ment of existing decentralization arrangements. Grants of indepeQ.d-
ent litigating authority to departments and agencies within the 
executive may be subject to Justice Department supervision. Some of 
these entities have voluntarily ceded this litigation authority to the 
Attorney General; others may be directed to do so by the President. 
Plainly, independent litigation authority does not bar a President 
from conditioning employment within the executive to those who fol-
low the Attorney General's lead on litigation matters. Nonstatutory 
decentralization arrangements are also subject to presidential influ-
ence. No formal statutory limitation impedes the President's repeal of 
either tacit understandings, such as those between the Tennessee Val-
ley Authority and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporations, 23 or 
explicit arrangements formalized in "memorandums of understand-
ing" between the Justice Department and the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency ("EPA") or the Departments of Energy and Labor. 24 
The likelihood of the President's exercising such political muscle 
is quite another thing. The Bush and Reagan administrations, espe-
cially in challenging EPA authority to sue federal facilities, took issue 
with some preexisting decentralization arrangements. 25 These ar-
rangements were challenged as improper limitations on executive 
branch policy coordination and, with it, the President's constitutional 
prerogative to secure the faithful implementation of the laws. Other 
administrations, most notably the Carter and Nixon administrations, 
21 Memorandum of Disapproval for the Whistle-blower Protection Act of 1988, 24 
WEEKLY CoMP. PRES. Doc. 1377 (Oct. 26, 1988). 
22 See Memorandum from American Law Division, The Library of Congress, Congres-
sional Research Service, to Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs; May 
4, 1992 (discussing Department of Justice objections to establishing an Office of Federal Hous-
ing Enterprise Oversight). 
23 See Attorney General as Chief Litigator, supra note 12, at 47 n.l. 
24 See Olson, supra note 7, at 77-78. 
25 See Environmental Compliance by Federal Agencies: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, IOOth Cong., 1st 
Sess. 182, 206-13 (1987) (statement of F. Henry Habicht II, Assistant Attorney General, Land 
and Natural Re5ources Division); id. at 678-84 (letter from Robert A. McConnell, Assistant 
Attorney General; Office of Legislative Affairs). 
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supported the use of memorandums of understanding which limited 
Department of Justice control. 
Finally, the political will of the executive plays a critical. role in 
defining what weight will be accorded agency and departmental per-
spectives when litigation authority remains in the Department of Jus-
tice. Again, different administrations subscribe to different visions of 
Attorney General contJ;ol. The Carter and Reagan administrations 
offer a useful point of contrast. Carter's Attorney General Griffin Bell 
embraced the bureaucratic vision, emphasizing that Justice Depart-
ment lawyers "must take care not to interfere with the policy preroga-
tives of our agency clients. An agency's views should be presented to 
a court unless they are inconsistent with overall governmental inter-
ests, or cannot fairly be argued."26 Consistent with this view, Bell 
directed the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel ("OLC") to 
prepare a memorandu~ opinion advocating the insulation of the So-
licitor General's office from White House influence. 27 The Reagan 
administration advocated a far different view of the Attorney Gen-
eral's role when "faced with conflicting demands, e.g., where a 'client' 
agency ... dissociate[s] itself from legal or policy judgments to which 
the Executive subscribes [or] where a 'client' agency attempts to liti-
gate against another agency or department .... "28 In those instances, 
according to an OLC opinion, signed by its office head Theodore Ol-
son, "the Attorney General's obligation to represent and advocate the 
'client' agency's position must yield to a higher obligation to [follow 
the President's lead and] take care that 'the laws be executed faith-
fully."29 Admittedly, Olson, like Bell, refers to agencies as clients. In 
contrast to Bell, Olson's disdain for this characterization is revealed in 
his repeated insertion of quotation marks around "client." 
Not surprisingly, Carter and Reagan administration practices va-
ried substantially. The Carter administration openly aired disputes 
before the Supreme Court, between the Department of Justice and 
numerous executive departments and agencies, including the Depart-
ments of Defense, Interior, and Labor.30 Disputes between the Justice 
Department and independent agencies ~ere also aired before the 
26 Griffin B. Bell, The Attorney General: The Federal Government's Chief Lawyer and Chief 
Litigator, or One Among Many?, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 1049, 1061 (1978). 
2 7 Role of the Solicitor General, 1 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 228 (1977). 
28 Attorney General as Chief Litigator, supra note 12, at 62. 
29 Id. 
30 The Department of Interior's separate views were attached in an appendix to the Brief 
for the Solicitor General, Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (No. 76-1701). The 
Departments of Defense and Labor, along with the Office of Personnel Management and the 
EEOC, filed an amicus brief at odds with the Solicitor's amicus brief. Brief for the Depart-
ments of Defense and Labor, the Office of Personnel Management and the EEOC, Personnel 
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Supreme Court-even in cases where the Attorney General (through 
the Solicitor General) had plenary control over the litigation. 31 Rea-
gan's Department of Justice was far less willing to acknowledge in-
tragovemmental disputes. However, the Reagan Justice Department 
missed the unitariness mark by quite a bit. During Reagan's first 
term, Solicitor General Rex Lee sometimes resolved conflicts between 
the Justice Department and independent agencies by either noting dis-
agreements between his office and the agency in Solicitor General fil-
ings or by allowing the agency to represent itself. 32 During Reagan's 
second term, Solicitor General Charles Fried, with one significant ex-
ception, refused to note intragovemmental disputes. 33 Fried, how-
ever, did not see himself as an executive branch subordinate; instead, 
he viewed himself as a representative of his own interests before the 
Supreme Court. 34 The repudiation of the unitary executive model by 
the words and deeds of the Carter administration and-perhaps more 
telling-the variable commitment to unitariness by the supposedly 
ideological Reagan administration suggests that intraexecutive as well 
as outside forces place political obstacles in the way of unitary legal 
interpretations. 3s 
Proponents of a unitary executive cannot discount these outside 
forces. For example, the White House has strong incentive to be cog-
nizant of congressional preferences. Congress, among ot}ler things, 
possesses the power of the purse and the power to confine delegated 
authority to the executive through the crafting of more specific legis-
lation. Congress also possesses significant power over Department of 
Justice control of litigation. Congress, on occasion, makes use of this 
power. Threats to remove the EPA from Justice Department control 
prompted a "memorandum of understanding" designed to protect 
EPA prerogatives. 36 More striking, Congress, prompted by the lob-
bying efforts of the Federal Trade Commission {"FTC"), statutorily 
Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeny, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (No. 78-233); Brief for the Solicitor General, 
Feeny (No. 78-233). 
31 See generally Devins, supra note 12. See also John A. Jenkins, The Solicitor General's 
Winning Ways, 69 A.B.A. J. 734 (1983). 
32 See Devins, supra note 12 (discussing such cases as Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983), 
Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 44 (1982), and Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 
U.S. 561 (1984)); see also infra note 69 and accompanying text. 
33 See generally Devins, supra note 12. The exception is a case involving the constitution-
ality of the U.S. Sentencing Commission, see Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989). 
Fried's handling of Mistretta is discussed in FRIED, supra note 2. 
34 See McGinnis, supra note 16. 
3S The term "intraexecutive forces" simply refers to the divergent constituencies existing 
within the executive, even among the President's political appointees. The terms "outside 
forces" or "external forces" refer to interest groups, Congress, etc .. 
36 See MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ON CIVIL ENFORCEMENT BETWEEN THE 
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responded to Solicitor General and Antitrust Division efforts to un-
dermine FfC litigation authority. Finding that "the investigative and 
law enforcement responsibilities of the Federal Trade Commission 
have been restricted and hampered because of inadequate legal au-
thority,'m Congress enacted legislation protecting the Commission's 
independent litigating authority in enforcement actions. 38 
The prospect of congressional intervention cannot be dismissed. 
It is nonetheless true, as former OLC head Douglas Kmiec argued, 
that "presidential power is often best defined by the strength of presi-
dential will. " 39 A President who believes in hierarchical government 
must work at preserving the authority of his office. The FfC legisla-
tion, for example, was signed by President Nixon in exchange for con-
gressional support of the Alaska Pipeline.40 A President who believed 
in the unitary executive would not have engaged in such a bargain. 
Aside from refusing to accede to such legislative initiatives, a Presi-
dent can protect executive branch prerogatives in the face of intraex-
ecutive disputes by demanding that his political appointees (including 
the Attorney General) acquiesce to a unitary governmental position in 
court. 
The practices of modem administrations suggest that presidents 
are unlikely to. consistently advance the unitary executive model. 
Some administrations simply prefer the bureaucratic model to the 
unitary model, and others place different values ahead of unitariness. 
The Clinton administration, by its own admission, places "the need to 
showcase the ethnic, racial and gender variety of [the Democratic] 
party [ahead ofj any ideological litmus tests, [or] concerns about in-
ternal policy cohesion."41 Finally, even those administrations ostensi-
bly committed to the unitary model are ultimately unwilling to 
consistently demand unitariness in the face of divergent interests both 
within the executive and on Capitol Hill.42 Ronald Reagan, for exam-
ple, voluntarily ceded executive power by approving Comptroller 
General budget authority in Gramm-Rudman and independent coun-
JUSTICE DEPARTMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (June 13, 1977), 
reprinted in Env't Rep.-Fed. Laws (BNA) at 41:0101 (Oct. 30, 1992). 
37 Pub. L. No. 93-153, § 408(a)(l), 87 Stat. 591 (1973). 
38 Id. 
39 KMIEC, supra note 1, at 47. 
40 See Devins, supra note 12. 
41 David S. Broder, Diversity was Paramount in Building the Cabinet, WASH. PosT, Dec. 
25, 1992, at Al. 
42 This explains disunitariness in the Reagan administration's policy on civil rights. See 
Devins, supra note 8, at 1749-63; HERMAN BELZ, EQUALITY TRANSFORMED 181-209 (1991). 
See generally Jeremy Rabkin, Reagan's Secret Quotas, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 5, 1985, at 15. 
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sel prosecutions under the Ethics in Government Act. 43 
Indisputably, political will plays an extraordinary role, moderat-
ing the vigor of the executive's pursuit of hierarchical control of gov-
ernment litigation. The Reagan and Bush administrations, for 
example, advanced unitariness concerns with far greater regularity 
than either the Nixon or Carter administration. Political will also 
plays a large role in fostering resistance to this unitary model by 
either Congress or affected governmental agencies. The question re-
mains whether structural constraints on presidential power diminish 
the role of political will in defining the unitariness of the government 
in court. Departments and agencies technically under the President's 
control cannot escape ali energetic Executive. Are independent agen-
cies without independent litigating authority equally subject to such 
presidential control? Finally, what about cases where the agency pos-
sesses independent litigating authority and its head cannot be fired by 
the President? Do these structural constraints determine whether an 
independent agency will speak its own voice in court or does political 
will still play a paramount role? The remainder of this Article will 
speak to these questions. 
II. UNITARINESS AND INDEPENDENCE 
The structural paradigm of agency independence anticipates that 
an independent agency will assert its own views when confronted with 
a conflicting executive branch interpretation. Otherwise, it would be 
senseless to prevent the President from dismissing independent 
agency heads at will. The structural paradigm likewise assumes that 
independent litigating authority and other constraints on the Presi-
dent's power are necessary to provide independent agencies with a 
podium from which they can speak their own voice. If the agencies 
were not granted i'ndependent litigating authority, for example, the 
Department of Justice would not sublimate its views thereby enabling 
the independent agency to act as the government's mouthpiece. 
The structural trappings of independence define much of the dia-
logue between the executive branch and independent agencies. The 
political willfulness of various governmental actors also plays a large 
role. The EEOC· abandoned independence in the face of a willful ex-
ecutive and disinterested Congress. In sharp contrast, the Depart-
ment of Justice abdicated control to the FCC to accommodate the 
President's recently named appointees and perhaps the President him-
self. Finally, the Postal Service withstood executive assertions of 
43 See supra note 20. 
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power because poor strategic planning severely weakened the White 
House's power base. · 
A. The EEOC, the Department of Justice, and the Congress 
1. The EEOC v. the Department of Justice 
. 
EEOC litigation in federal district courts is ·structurally pro-
tected from Executive control and its .decision making is insulated 
from direct presidential supervision. The EEOC is a multimember 
agency headed by five commissioners.44 Each commissioner serves a 
five-year term45 and presumably can only be removed for cause.46 
Barring resignations, no President can appoint a majority of the Com-
mission until the third year of his first term. Partisan controls are 
further limited by the requirement that no more than three commis-
sioners be of the same political party. This independence figures 
prominently in litigation decisions, for the EEOC lias independent lit-
igating authority before lower federal courts to initiate specified cate-
gories of employment discrimination lawsuits.47 EEOC litigation 
authority is further insulated from executive control because the 
EEOC general counsel, while a presidential appointee, serves a fixed 
four-year term. · 
The structural independence of the EEOC is far from complete. 
The EEOC is technically located within the executive brancl}. More 
significant, unlike independent regulatory agencies which possess 
quasi-adjudicatory and quasi-legislative authority, EEOC authority is 
exclusively executive. For the most part, the EEOC interprets various 
employment discrimination statutes and applies its in~erpretation 
through litigation.48 Th.e nexus between the EEOC and the executive 
branch is further heightened by an intermingling of fun_ctions that 
takes place both at the Department of Justice. and at the Commission; 
The EEOC, through a Carter . administration reorganization, 
44 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(a) (1988). 
45 /d. 
46 The EEOC statute, like those for the FCC and other independent agencies, is silent on 
the grounds for removal. It would be senseless, however, for heads of multimember. agencies, 
who serve staggered terms, and who may not belong to the President's political party, to serve 
at the pleasure of the President. Otherwise, the elaborate statutory. structure designed to limit 
presidential authority would be a farce. · 
47 The statute provides that "the Commission may bring a civil action against any respon-
dent not a government, governmental agency, or political subdivision named in the charge .... 
[T]he Attorney General ... may bring a civil action ·against [a government, governmental 
agency, or political subdivision] in the appropriate United States district court." 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-S(t) (1988). 
48 See U.S. CoMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT OF EQUAL EM-
PLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS 10-11 (1987). . ' 
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took charge of several employment discrimination areas that were 
previously the responsibility of executive departments and agencies. 
Under this reorganization, the EEOC assumed Department of Labor 
and Civil Service Commission authority over the Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act, the Equal Pay Act, and various federal sector 
equal employment opportunity requirements. 49 The EEOC was also 
dubbed the "lead agency" in employment discrimination matters and 
authorized to coordinate the enforcement strategies of eighteen gov-
ernmental agencies with Title VII enforcement power. 50 This author-
ity, among other things, included the power to demand that all 
governmental agencies file affirmative action plans, with goals and 
timetables, to the EEOC.51 Through its designated role as lead coor-
dinator as well as its assumption of power from purely executive enti-
ties, EEOC operations commingle with executive branch authority. 
Direct EEOC involvement with the executive is also a by-prod-
uct of Department of Justice authority to separately enforce and inter-
pret employment discrimination laws. Suits against state and local 
government are the exclusive province of the Civil Rights Division. 52 
The Civil Division, which represents the government when it is sued 
in employment discrimination matters, also has the power to indepen-
dently interpret employment discrimination laws. Finally, . at the 
Supreme Court level, all employment discrimination litigation is han-
dled by the Solicitor General. 53 With three separate offices in the Jus-
tice Department litigating employment discrimination cases, the 
Department has a very strong interest in controlling the government's 
position in discrimination litigation. Needless to say, the potential for 
serious conflict between the Justice Department and the Commission 
is also great. Clearly, this concurrence of authority is combustible. 
The explosion eventually occurred during the Reagan administration. 
The triggering event was an amicus brief supporting race-con-
49 Reorg. Plan No. I of 1978, 3 C.F.R. § 321 (1979), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 
(1988 & Supp. III 1992) (printed following the statute on pp. 410-11). See also James W. 
Singer, Equal Employment Agencies are Beginning to Shape Up, 10 NAT'L. J. 19 (1978). 
so While recognizing EEOC "leadership and coordination" responsibilities, Executive Or-
der 12,067 specifies that disputes between EEOC and other federal entities may be referred to 
the Executive Office of the President. Exec. Order No. 12,067 (1-201), (1-307(c)), 43 Fed. Reg. 
28,967 (1987). Additionally, Executive Order 12,250, entitled "Leadership and Coordination 
of Nondiscrimination Laws," grants the Department of Justice the explicit power to coordi-
nate enforcement of statutory nondiscrimination in federal funding provisions. Exec. Order 
No. 12,250, 45 Fed. Reg. 72,995 (1980). 
51 See U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 48, at 41. 
52 42 u.s.c. § 2000e-5(0 (1988). 
53 Solicitor General authority over Supreme Court litigation can only be limited by an 
explicit statutory exception. EEOC independent litigation authority clearly does not extend to 
the Supreme Court. See supra note 4 7. 
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scious affirmative action that the EEOC intended to file before a fed-
eral appeals court in Williams v. City of New Orleans. 54 The EEOC 
draft brief flatly contradicted a Department of Justice Civil Rights 
Division· amicus brief that had already been filed in the case. 55 In-
deed, the EEOC characterized the Justice Department's failure to 
consult the EEOC before filing its amicus brief as "deplorable."56 
Rather than permitting the expression of conflicting views, which as 
the EEOC put it, would be of "considerable public benefit,"57 the Jus-
tice Department saw the EEOC brief as an outrageous challenge to 
the Civil Rights Division's exclusive authority to manage employment 
discrimination lawsuits involving state and local government. In the 
Civil Rights Division's view, the government must speak with a uni-
fied voice in state and local cases and that voice is the Civil Rights 
Division. To prove its point, the Civil Rights Division claimed that it 
would block the EEOC from filing its amicus brief. 58 
The Civil Rights Division claim is at odds with structural con-
straints that protect EEOC autonomy. Although the Civil Rights Di-
vision has exclusive authority to initiate state and local cases, there 
are no statutory limits on the EEOC's independent authority to par-
ticipate in lower court employment discrimination cases. Structural 
limits on executive control, instead, suggest that the EEOC would de-
fend its stake in independent interpretations of employment discrimi-
nation laws through participation in state and local cases. For the 
EEOC, Williams was not simply a state and local case. If accepted, 
the Justice Department's position in Williams would undermine the 
EEOC's private sector litigation strategy, including several EEOC-ini-
tiated private sector consent decrees. 59 The EEOC understood the 
54 729 F.2d 1554 (5th Cir. 1984). 
ss The Justice Department brief argued that the affirmative action plan infringed on the 
rights of "innocent nonblack employees." Brief for the Justice Department Before Fifth Circuit 
Asking En Bane Rehearing in Williams v. City of New Orleans, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No.6, 
at E-1 (Jan. 10, 1983). The EEOC brief castigated the Department of Justice: 
Contrary to this uniform body of case law approving the use of prospective em-
ployment goals, however, the Department of Justice asks this Court to hold that 
judicial relief under Title VII must be limited to restoring actual victims of dis-
crimination .... No court has accepted the Justice Department's construction of 
[this portion of Title VII] . . . . · 
Draft EEOC Brief in Williams v. City of New Orleans, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 67, at E-1 
(Apr. 6, 1983), available in LEXIS, BNA Library, DLABRT file. 
S6 EEOC Chides Justice for "Deplorable" Action on New Orleans Police Case, Daily Lab. 
Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at A-2 (Feb. 1, 1983). 
57 Fred Barbash & Juan Williams, Administration Prods EEOC on Quotas Brief, WASH. 
POST, Apr. 7, 1983, at Al. 
58 See EEOC Bows to White House Pressure, Says It Won't File New Orleans Brief [herein-
after White House Pressure], Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 67, at A-6 (Apr. 6, 1983). 
s9 According to EEOC Chair Clarence Thomas, "judicial ratification of the Justice Depart-
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impact of Williams on its litigation strategy; the Commission also rec-
ognized that the Justice Department's disregard of the EEOC's role 
"as the chief interpreter of Title VII" represented "a major ... change 
in government's civil rights policy."60 
The EEOC's strong interest in Williams, strengthened by struc-
tural constraints on executive authority, suggests that the EEOC 
would have stood firm in the face of this Civil Rights Division chal-
lenge, and filed its amicus·brief. In the end, however, the EEOC ca-
pitulated to the Jus~ice Department challenge.· The turning event was 
a White House meeting between EEOC chair Clarence Thomas and 
general counsel David Slate, with presidential counsel Ed Meese, At-
torney General William French Smith, and Civil Rights Division 
head William Bradford Reynold~. 61 
The factors leading to the EEOC's ·withdrawal in Williams are 
complex; clearly the structural paradigm of agency independence 
sheds little light upon the situation. The Commission's stated reason 
was that the "public interest" was not served by the presentation of 
"conflicting [govei'Jllllental] views on a legal issue involving a city 
government where the Justice Department has sole enforcement liti-
gation respo~sibility. "62 This explanation, of course, flatly contra-
dicts the EEOC's earlier assertion that the presentation of its 
conflicting views would be of ~·considerable publjc benefit." A more 
likely explanation is 'that the White House meeting convinced the 
EEOC heads that it would be politically unwise to do battle with the 
Justi~ Department. During 'the Williams controversy, OLC issued 
an opinion in support of the Civil Rights Division. This opinion went 
beyond the state and local authority issue to assert that the Carter 
administration reorganization, by transferring authority from the De-
partment of Labor and the Civil Service Commission to the EEOC, de 
facto made the EEOC an executiv.e agency "subject to the supervision 
and control of the President."63 That the EEOC had earlier partici-
pated in public sector cases was irrelevant. OLC viewed such appear-
ances as having "been'made with the approval of the attorney general, 
ment's position would undermine the Commission's guidelines, settlements, consent decrees 
and court orders." U.S. CoMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 48, at 41 n.310. 
60 White House Pressure, supra note !18 (quoting letter fr9m the EEOC to Attorney Gen-
eral Smith). See also Federal Agencies Differ Sharply Over New Orleans Affirmative Action 
Plan, 21 Gov't Empl. Rei. Rep. '(BNA) No. 1004, at 581 (Mar. 14, 1983). 
61 See Barbash & Williams, supra note 57. 
62 White House Pressure, supra note 58. 
63 The OLC opinion is described in Report by House Committee on Government Operations 
on EEOC Handling of Sex-Based Wage ·Discrimination, reprinted in Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) 
No. 102, at D-1 (May 2!1, 1984). 
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whether implicit or explicit."64 
The OLC opinion suggested that the Justice Department was 
prepared to use Williams as a vehicle to neutnllize EEOC indepen-
dence in both public and private sector litigation. EEOC chairman 
Thomas took the bait, demurely commenting· that "(t]his case has 
clarified our standing .... It points out to Congress the chink in our 
armor ... [that] we are in the executive branch which has its own 
opinions.''6s This concession is truly extraordinary. EEOC private 
sector litigation authority was not before the court in Williams. Con-
sequently, rather than risk an adverse court ruling on 'public sector 
authority, the EEOC effectively admitted defeat by not creating the 
opportunity for a favorable court ruling. Ironically, the appellate 
court in Williams made reference to the EEOCs draft brief, a leaked 
copy of which had been submitted to the court through an amicus 
brief.66 
The EEOC did little more than put up a feeble fight in Williams. 
It is difficult to know whether the Justice Department frightened the 
Commission with its legal arguments or convinced EEOC appointees 
that their political futures hinged on acquiescence to its position. 
What is clear is that the EEOC did not seek strength in supposedly 
empowering structural constraints on executive authority. Instead, 
the interplay of various political players; their expectations, and their 
willingness to assert power provides insight into the outcome in 
Williams. 
The EEOC not only lost the battle over Jfilliams; it l_ost a much 
larger battle with the Justice Department as a .consequence of Wil-
liams. The Justice Department, in the wake of Williams, relegated 
the EEOC to the executive branch. Rather than serving as lead 
agency, the Justice Department views the EEOC ~ its "whipping 
boy." For example, the Department has. flatly refused to submit an 
affirmative action plan to. the EEOC, prompting the ·EEOC to main-
tain that it cannot enforce the requirement. 67 More striking, the So-
licitor General refuses to recognize the EEOC as an independent 
agency. While the EEOC may seek to persuade the Solicitor General 
of the correctness of its posit~on on a given issue (and indeed may 
influence Solicitor General decision making), the Solicitor General to-
64 Ruth Simon, Future Role of EEOC Questioned; A Shift of Authority, NAT'L. L.J., May 2, 
1983, at 7. · · 
6S Juan Williams, Lawmaker Urges EEOC Not to Quit Rights Case, WASH. PoST, Apr. 10, 
1983, at All. · · 
66 See Williams v. City of New Orleans, 729 F.2d 1554, 1571-73 (5th Cir. 1984) (Wisdom, 
J., et al., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
67 See U.S. CoMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 48; at 41 n.315. 
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day seems disinclined to allow the EEOC to advance competing argu-
ments before the Supreme Court. 
This practice can be linked to the Williams controversy. 
Throughout the Carter administration, the EEOC was allowed to file 
briefs in direct opposition to Solicitor General positions. 68 During 
Reagan's first term, Solicitor General Rex Lee noted disagreements 
between his office and the EEOC. 69· Following the Williams dispute, 
however, the Solicitor General freely disregarded competing EEOC 
perspectives-even in cases where the EEOC was a party. This is 
precisely what occurred in Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC. 10 
Sheet Metal Workers marked the culmination of the EEOC's 
transformation into the executive branch (for at least the Department 
of justice). Although the EEOC, a party in the case, had S"Qccessfully 
defended federal court authority to order affirmative action hiring in 
an employment discrimination lawsuit,71 the Solicitor General unilat-
erally reversed the Commission's position in a brief it filed with the 
Supreme Court on behalf of the Commission. 72 That the EEOC was a 
party mattered little to the Solicitor General. In his autobiography, 
Order and Law, Charles Fried did not even mention the EEOC in his 
extensive accounting of the caseY Moreover, when the EEOC ex-
plained its position to Solicitor General attorneys, it was told that it 
was a part of the executive and would have to accept Department of 
68 See supra note 30 (discussing separate filing by EEOC in Personnel Administrator of 
Massachusetts v. Feeny). 
69 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 24 n.23, 
Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984) (No. 82-206) ("The Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission disagrees with this interpretation of Section 706(g) and 
believes that its adoption might call into question numerous extant consent decrees and concil-
iation agreements to which the EEOC is a party."); Brief for the United States as Amicus 
Curiae at 1-2 n.l, Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982) (No. 80-2147) (noting dispute 
between Solicitor General and EEOC). Justice Brennan, who rejected the Department of Jus-
tice's position, referred to the EEOC's refusal to sign onto the Department of Justice brief in 
his opinion. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982). 
70 478 u.s. 421 (1986). 
71 EEOC v. Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n, 753 F.2d 1172 (2d Cir. 
1985), aff'd, Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n. v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986). 
72 See Brief for the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Local 28 of the Sheet 
Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986) (No. 84-1656). Remarkably, then-
Acting EEOC General Counsel Johnny Butler signed this brief. However, Butler claimed in 
an interview that he and the EEOC vigorously opposed the Solicitor General's position. It is 
difficult to determine whether Butler sought to win favor with the Reagan. administration 
through his signature or whether he honestly felt obligated to sign the brief. Whatever the 
explanation, Butler and the EEOC did not alter their views on the permissibility of affirmative 
action. Telephone -Interview with Johnny Butler, former Acting General Counsel of the 
EEOC (Sept. 16, 1992). 
73 See FRIED, supra note 2, at 110-14. 
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Justice opposition to affirmative action. 74 The only concession the So-
licitor General made to the EEOC was that it opposed the grant of 
certiorari so that the Court could resolve the Sheet Metal Workers 
issue in an analogous case already before the Court. 75 It is unclear 
whether this concession was rooted in a desire to accord some respect 
to EEOC positions or whether the Solicitor General feared the reper-
cussions of disregarding EEOC views altogether. Once certiorari was 
granted, however, EEOC prerogatives played no apparent role in the 
Solicitor General's handling of the case. 
Sheet Metal Workers is an extreme example of the Solicitor Gen-
eral's discounting of EEOC autonomy but it is not an anomaly. In 
Riverside v. Rivera/6 the Solicitor General rejected EEOC efforts to 
participate as an amicus supporting plaintiffs' claims in an attorney 
fee case. 77 Instead, the Solicitor General filed an amicus brief in op-
position to plaintiffs' claims without mention of the EEOC's conflict-
ing position. 78 Ironically, EEOC arguments were presented to the 
Court-the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund reproduced 
a leaked draft of the rejected EEOC brief in its amicus filing. 79 An-
other recent example of Solicitor General unwillingness to recognize 
EEOC differences is Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. 80 In Price 
Waterhouse, the Solicitor General did not note EEOC disagreement 
with its view that evidence of sexual stereotyping could be rebutted by 
a preponderance of the evidence, rather than clear and convincing 
evidence. 81 
Solicitor General Fried's willingness to heed OLC's opinion on 
the EEOC's executive branch status is not surprising. The Solicitor 
General need not defer to voices within the executive that contradict 
his own conception of executive branch desires. 82 The EEOC's subor-
74 Telephone Interview with Johnny Butler, fanner Acting General Counsel of the EEOC 
(Sept. 16, 1992). 
75 See Brief for the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission at 9, Local 28 of the 
Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986) (No. 84-1656). 
76 477 u.s. 561 (1986). 
77 See Justice Department Rejects EEOC Advice, Seeks Limit on Lawyer Fees in Rights 
Cases, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 6, at A-1 (Jan. 9, 1986). 
78 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, City of River-
side v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561 (1986) (No. 85-224). 
79 Appendix to Brief Amicus Curiae of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, 
Inc. in Support of Respondents, City of Riverside v. Santos, 477 U.S. 561 (1986) (No. 85-224). 
80 490 u.s. 228 (1989). 
8t See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 23-24 n.lO, Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (No. 87-1167). Respondent's attorney noted this omission in 
their brief: "The Solicitor General's failure to comment on EEOC's position ... is curious." 
Brief for Respondent at 42 n.32, Price Waterhouse (No. 87-1167). 
82 See generally Devins, supra note 12; McGinnis, supra note 16. 
HeinOnline -- 15  Cardozo L. Rev.  292 1993 - 1994
292 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW [VoL 15:273 
dination to the executive branch therefore enhances Solicitor General 
authority. On an issue as polarizing as affirmative action, where one 
would expect ideological consistency within the executive, the author-
ity to advance a unitary governmental position is especially impor-
tant. That affirmative action was the agenda item for the Civil Rights 
Division also lent support to intradepartmental Solicitor General con-
trol. Moreover, without any statutory claim in support of independ-
ent litigating authority before the Supreme Court, the EEOC had 
little leverage to combat this Solicitor General interpretation. In 
other words, the Solicitor General had the power and was willing to 
use it. Furthermore, .the EEOC's acceptance of Justice Department 
authority in Williams was the functional equivalent of a "kick me" 
sign to potentially conflicting Justice Department interests. 
The battle between the Justice Department and the EEOC was 
inevitable. The Department of Justice perceived the EEOC as a 
threat to its own power, to the Department's civil rights agenda, and 
to the ability of the government to speak with a unified voice. With 
the Department of Justice prepared to reign over the EEOC and cur-
tail its power, the EEOC was wide open to attack. Thus, the control 
of government employment discrimination litigation demonstrates the 
Justice Department's willingness to launch ·a political broadside 
against the EEOC and the Commission's concomitant failure to fend 
off these political advances. Congress's acquiescence to this Justice 
Department pQwer-play was also of prime importance. Indeed, Con-
gress's inability or unwillingness to create a truly executive or in-
dependent EEOC set the stage for the Williams controversy. 
2. Congressional Indeterminacy and the EEOC 
Congressional expectations regarding the EEOC's power were 
shaped by the tortuous evolution of the agency, from its creation in 
1964 to its ultimate reorganization in 1978. By the time the big show-
down between Justice and the EEOC finally came about, Congress 
understood the EEOC to be principally a weak agency. Moreover, 
Congress considered the EEOC to be slightly more executive than in-
dependent in nature. Thus, although Congress urged the EEOC to 
resist Department of Justice control, Congress was unwilling to inter-
vene and actively prevent EEOC subjugation to Justice Department 
authority. 
The EEOC had less than auspicious beginnings. In the complex 
battle over the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the EEOC was the victim of 
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partisan compromise. 83 The Kennedy administration bill rejected the 
establishment of any federal enforcement agency in favor of increased 
funding and statutory recognition of the Vice President's Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Committee. 84 Instead, congressional liberals 
favored the creation of a full-blown independent regulatory agency 
with both quasi-judicial and cease-and-desist authority.8s Moderates 
and conservatives alike cringed at the prospect of employer "harass-
ment" by "a new mission agency like the EEOC."86 The solution was 
a peculiar structural compromise which left the EEOC a "poor enfee-
bled thing. " 87 
While structured like an independent agency with multiple com-
missioners serving staggered terms, the EEOC had no real power. Its 
role was limited to complaint processing associated with private en-
forcement. The 1964 Civil Rights Act also authorized the Justice De-
partment to file "pattern and practice" cases. The placement of 
litigation authority with the Attorney General rather than the EEOC 
was less a matter of the executive having control over the issue and 
more a matter of the substantive implications of Justice Department 
control. Congressional moderates believed that the Justice Depart-
ment would only file a small number of high profile cases rather than 
engage in massive litigation. 88 
The history of the EEOC's establishment demonstrates Con-
gress's low expectations for its authority; without protest, the hopes 
for a powerful Title VII enforcement agency died. Further complica-
tions stemmed from the peculiar blend of Department of Justice liti-
gation authority with an EEOC structured as an independent agency 
but possessing (at least in 1964) none of its powers. The EEOC, as 
Wendy Watson put it, "was a duck which could neither waddle nor 
quack, but it was a duck nonetheless. " 89 
The EEOC's structure and authority was again at issue before 
Congress in 1972. Not surprisingly, the 1964 model accomplished lit-
tle, and Congress was set to weigh in to ensure more vigorous enforce-
83 Memorandum from American Law Division, The Library of Congress, Congressional 
Research Service, to Senate Committee on Government Operations, regarding Status of Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission [hereinafter Status of EEOC], Sept. 19, 1977, at 7 (cit-
ing legislative history of Title VII and XI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). 
84 See generally HUGH D. GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA 125-52 (1990). 
85 See id. at 83-87. 
86 /d. at 146. 
87 Remarks by Alfred W. Blumrosen, Professor, Rutgers Law School on Binding Effect of 
EEOC Affirmative Action Guidelines, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 89, at D-1 (May 8, 1984). 
88 See GRAHAM, supra note 84, at 146. 
89 Wendy L. Watson, The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission: A Less-Loved 
Stepchild 21 (1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author). 
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ment of employment discrimination legislation. Congress was to 
decide whether it should accomplish this objective by granting the 
EEOC quasi-adjudicatory "cease-and-desist" authority (administra-
tive enforcement) or by expanding its governmental litigation author-
ity (judicial enforcement). Congress chose the judicial enforcement 
model as a result of the mismatched lobbying of civil rights interests 
and the Nixon White House. Civil rights interests, emphasizing the 
dangers of a regulatory agency becoming "captive" to the regulated 
industry, argued that a weaker institutional framework (that is, one in 
which the agency did not have cease-and-desist authority) enabled 
civil rights activists to use federal courts "which are favorable to their 
demands. "90 The Nixon administration favored judicial enforcement 
for exactly opposite reasons, namely, "the Republicans' vintage judi-
cial strategy of maximizing the role of adversary proceedings in court 
so as to minimize the judgmental discretion of New Dealish regula-
tory agencies. "91 
The 1972 amendments gave the EEOC litigation authority in the 
private sector and entrusted state and local cases to the Justice De-
partment. The choice of a judicial enforcement model over a tradi-
tional regulatory structure is revealing. It suggests a purposeful 
devaluing of the administrative state and, with it, congressional over-
sight in shaping the development of employment discrimination pro-
tections. With reference to Congress's understanding of the EEOC's 
status, however, the 1972 amendments contain very little. Although 
cease-and-desist authority was again rejected, the strange hodgepodge 
of supporters and rationales did little to define congressional under-
standing of the EEOC's independent status. 
Congress's uncertainty over the EEOC's status is revealed in a 
1977 request by one of the EEOC's oversight committees, the Senate 
Committee on Government Operations, to the Congressional Re-
search Service for clarification of whether the EEOC is an independ-
ent agency.92 The Congressional Research Service's response is 
equally telling. Noting that although 
[t]he precise question of the EEOC's status does not appear to have 
been directly raised during consideration by the Congress of Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ... [ t ]he evolution of that title, 
together with some indirect comments on the matter militate 
against the conclusion that the EEOC is an independent regulatory 
90 GRAHAM, supra note 84, at 431. 
91 /d. at 426-27. 
92 Status of EEOC, supra note 83, at 1. 
HeinOnline -- 15  Cardozo L. Rev.  295 1993 - 1994
1993] POLITICAL WILL AND THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE 295 
commission. 93 
In 1978, Congress again faced this issue when the Carter admin-
istration submitted its reorganization plan to Congress for approval or 
legislative veto. The reorganization, envisioning a superagency in 
charge of civil rights, gave the EEOC lead authority to coordinate 
equal employment opportunity agencies and thereby "strengthen en-
forcement by coordinating the government's activities and eliminating 
duplication and waste of effort among the federal enforcement 
agencies. "94 
The reorganization was the brainchild of then EEOC chair Elea-
nor Holmes Norton. Frustrated by the EEOC's lack of power, Nor-
ton believed that the Commission should formally integrate its 
operations with executive departments and agencies. Even though 
Civil Rights Division head Drew Days, and others within the Carter 
administration, thought that the reorganization might eventually 
haunt its sponsors by symbolically lifting the EEOC's quasi-independ-
ent veneer,95 Norton persisted because she already considered the 
EEOC "an agency in the executive branch and not a traditional in-
dependent agency."96 · 
Whether Congress agreed with Norton is unclear. Without com-
ment, the House and Senate oversight committees allowed the reor-
ganization to take effect.97 Congress, apparently, did not see any need 
to structurally protect the EEOC's independence. 
The Williams controversy occurred in the aftershocks of Con-
gress's 1978 inaction. Relying on Congress's acquiescence to the 1978 
reorganization, the Justice Department claimed that only an executive 
EEOC could coordinate executive policymaking and receive Depart-
ment of Labor and Civil Service Commission authority by way of an 
administrative transfer of power. Williams thus presented Congress 
with another opportunity to define both EEOC policymaking and its 
position within government. 
Although it expressed dissatisfaction with the Commission's 
withdrawal from Williams, Congress declined to seize this opportu-
93 /d. at 7 (citing Legislative History of Title VII and XI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission). 
94 Eleanor H. Norton, Equal Employment Law: Crisis in Interpretation-Survival Against 
the Odds, 62 TUL. L. REV. 681, 706 n.98 (1988). . 
95 Telephone Interview with Drew Days, Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights dur-
ing the Carter administration (Sept. 24, 1992). Days has since become the Clinton administra-
tion Solicitor General. 
96 Norton, supra note 94, at 706. 
97 The reorganization was approved under a one-house legislative veto. After the Supreme 
Court's invalidation of the legislative veto, Congress enacted legislation approving en masse 
prior reorganizations. 
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nity. Instead, Congress cajoled and condemned the Commission for 
its refusal to challenge the Justice Department. House Judiciary chair 
Peter Rodino (D-N.J.) asked the Commission to supply Congress 
with all relevant correspondence with the Reagan administration. 98 
Moreover, EEOC chair Clarence Thomas was asked to testify about 
the Williams controversy before the House Judiciary and Labor Com-
mittees.99 Finally, the House Committee on Government Operations 
issued a report chastising the EEOC for failing to live up to its "obli-
gation to participate in court cases, particularly controversial or pre-
cedent setting cases . . . . " 100 At the least, the report continues, the 
EEOC should "bring the issue of its independence before a court for 
resolution." 101 In a remarkable bit of doublespeak, the report simul-
taneously speaks of the "EEOC retain[ing] its independent authority 
to enforce Title VII[,]"102 "[d]espite its status as an executive agency, 
subject to the authority of the President."103 
Congress, instead of criticizing the EEOC, should have looked at 
its own blemishes. Rather than protect the EEOC through legislation 
bolstering Commission autonomy or limiting Department of Justice 
intervention, Congress did little more than ask the EEOC to fend for 
itself. In short, Congress offered no genuine assistance. By asking the 
EEOC to simultaneously recognize presidential authority and inde-
pendently enforce Title VII, Congress asked for the impossible. Clar-
ence Thomas certainly recognized this dilemma, stating that the 
EEOC was "created to take the lead responsibility in setting civil 
rights policy in court but [it is] in the executive branch which has its 
own opinions. So there is a contradiction."104 From its establishment 
of the EEOC in 1964 to its approval of the 1978 reorganization, Con-
gress had consistently left the EEOC in never-never land status of 
part-executive part-independent agency. That the EEOC landed in 
the executive branch should have come as no surprise to a Congress 
that had never seen the EEOC as a strong independent voice. 
98 See Juan Williams, Lawmakers Urge EEOC not to Quit Rights Case, WASH. PoST, Apr. 
10, 1983, at All. 
99 Statements by EEOC Chairman Thomas, Assistant Attorney General Reynolds Before 
House Judiciary Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 
90, at F-1 (May 9, 1983). 
100 HOUSE CoMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, PAY EQUITY: EEOC's HAN-
DLING Of SEX-BASED WAGE DISCRIMINATION COMPLAINTS, H.R. REP. No. 796, 98th 
Cong., 2d Sess. S (1984). 
101 /d. 
102 /d. at 10. 
103 Id. 
104 Williams, supra note 98. 
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3. Summary 
The structural trappings of independence did not prevent the 
EEOC from conceding its independent litigating authority in Wil-
liams. These structural constraints, moreover, did not prevent the 
Justice Department from launching a frontal assault against the 
EEOC. Finally, Congress did not see Justice Department actions as 
an affront to congressional efforts to structurally protect the EEOC 
from executive branch intrusions; Congress's opprobrium was little 
more than rhetorical badgering, directed only at the EEOC. 
The interaction between the ·EEOC, the Justice Department, and 
the Congress suggests that agency independence is elusive. The struc-
tural paradigm must recognize the extraordinary role that political 
will plays in defining agency. independence. With respect to the 
EEOC, the Justice Department was highly motivated to achieve 
unitariness on affirmative action. The EEOC, in contrast, did not 
want to engage in a pitched battle with the Justice Department. In-
deed, in the aftermath of Williams, EEOC chair Thomas asserted that 
"EEOC's next four years will be marked by concerted efforts to set 
forth the Reagan Administrative's position on affirmative action."105 
Whether Thomas was driven by ideological consistency, political am-
bition, or the belief that the EEOC was subject to executive supervi-
sion, the EEOC's capitulation in Williams was complete. 
Supporters of a strong EEOC should not fault Chairman Thomas 
too much. The EEOC could not simultaneously maintain a strong 
independent voice and be an executive agency subordinate to the 
President. 106 While the Justice Department sought to push the EEOC 
into the executive, Congress placed no competing pressure on the 
Commission. Indeed, Congress's disinterest in the EEOC's status is 
significant. Congress paid little attention to the location of the EEOC 
in both 1964 and 1972 when it bargained away cease-and-desist au-
!OS Statements Before House Labor Subcommittee on Employment Opportunities on EEOC's 
Policies on Civil Rights, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 242, at D·l (Dec. 17, 1984) (statement of 
Barry Goldstein, assistant counsel, NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund). Chairman 
Thomas's willingness to acquiesce to executive will appeared as a permanent mark on his 
record to civil rights groups. For example, in explaining his organization's opposition to 
Thomas's Supreme Court nomination, Ralph Neas of the Leadership Conference on Civil 
Rights stated that "shortly after (Thomas] took that position of independence (in Williams], I 
think Edward Meese and William Bradford Reynolds met with him, and basically explained 
·what the Reagan administration position was going to be on civil rights issues. So again, I 
think the record has to speak for itself." News Conference of the Leadership Conference on 
Civil Rights, Fed. News Serv. (Aug. 7, 1991). 
106 Eleanor Holmes Norton's suggestion that the EEOC could have it both ways is clearly 
incorrect. See Norton, supra note 94. Officers who serve at the President's pleasure are ulti-
mately subordinate to the White House. 
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thority for other objectives. Congress's acquiescence to a 1978 reor-
ganization which immersed the EEOC into the executive branch 
likewise suggests an absence of commitment to a structurally in-
dependent EEOC. 
These political maneuverings explain the EEOC's curious struc-
ture. Without cease-and-desist authority and with the Justice Depart-
ment's concurrent authority to litigate employment discrimination 
actions, the EEOC was far from a prototypical independent regula-
tory agency. 107 The question of whether the numerous structural con-
straints which limited executive authority over the EEOC indeed 
placed the EEOC outside the executive, was ultimately a test of polit-
ical will. The executive asserted its domain and neither Congress nor 
the EEOC challenged this claim of authority. 
B. The FCC and the Postal Service: Department of Justice 
Initiatives and Congressional Expectations 
The role of political will in defining agency independence is cer-
tainly not limited to the EEOC. The recent experiences of the rCC 
and the Postal Service likewise make clear that structure is but one 
ingredient in determining whether the government will speak as a uni-
tary voice in court. In the case of the FCC, the Department of Justice 
chose to cede some of its litigating authority rather than battle the 
Congress and the Commission. The Postal Service case, like Wil-
liams, involved White House and Department of Justice efforts to 
overcome a statutory grant of independent litigation authority. Con-
trary to Williams, the Postal Service, thanks to greater structural pro-
tections and a weakened presidency, successfully fended off this 
executive initiative. 
1. The FCC 
The FCC is a statutorily designated independent regulatory 
agency. 108 Similar to the EEOC, it has five members who serve stag-
gered five-year terms, thereby limiting the President's appointment 
power to one commissioner per year. Like the EEOC, the appoint-
ment power is further constrained by the requirement that no more 
than three Commissioners may be members of the same political 
party. Finally, as with the EEOC, the President presumably (for the 
statute is silent) may only remove Commissioners for cause. 109 In 
contrast to the EEOC, the FCC possesses quasi-adjudicatory and 
107 See Status of EEOC, supra note 83. 
1os 44 U.S.C. § 3502(10) (Supp. III 1992). 
109 See supra note 46. 
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quasi-legislative powers, including cease-and-desist authority. FCC 
functions, moreover, are not formally intermingled with executive 
branch operations. 
FCC relationships with the Department of Justice are difficult to 
characterize. This difficulty is a byproduct of an extraordinarily con-
fusing statutory scheme which sometimes allows the FCC to appeal 
its cases directly to the Supreme Court, sometimes makes the FCC 
entirely dependent on Department of Justice attorneys throughout the 
course of litigation, and at times authorizes FCC representation 
before federal courts of appeals and Solicitor General representation 
before the Supreme Court. Department of Justice attorneys represent 
the FCC throughout the course of litigation in actions brought against 
the Commission to enforce its orders, as well as in employment dis-
crimination and Freedom of Information Act suits filed against the 
Commission. 110 In sharp contrast to this category of cases are those 
where the FCC has a statutory right to seek a writ of certiorari before 
the Supreme Court in appeals of FCC declaratory orders. 111 Finally, 
licensing decisions, handled by the FCC before federal appeals courts 
and by the Solicitor General before the Supreme Court, involve a 
murkier division of responsibility between the Commission and the 
Justice Department. 112 
Policy disputes between the FCC and. Justice. Department occur 
frequently. FCC licensing and regulation~ ·often ~conflict with Justice 
Department interpretations of antitrus~ laws, .as well as with the Con-
stitution's free speech and equality guarantees. The prospect of these 
disputes being aired in court depends both on the type of case and the 
willingness of the Justice Department to exclude the FCC from cases 
within its control. 
The structural paradigm, in many instances, holds true to form 
with the Justice Department declining to present FCC arguments 
with which it disagrees. One such dispute involved the League of Wo-
men Voters' challenge to a statutory prohibition of editorializing by 
public television and radio stations, a case controlled by the Justice 
Department from its inception. The FCC thought the editorial ban 
was unconstitutional; the Reagan Justice Department did not, how-
ever, and unilaterally pursued this case from beginning to end. 113 
When the Supreme Court rejected this Department of Justice defense 
and struck down the amended statute, the FCC rejoiced-calling the 
110 47 u.s.c. §§ 401, 504 (1988); 28 u.s.c. §§ 516, 519 (1988). 
Ill 47 u.s.c. § 402(j) (1988); 28 u.s.c. § 2350 (1988). 
112 47 u.s.c. § 402(b) (1988). 
113 See Devins, supra note 12. 
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decision "a significant breakthrough."114 Another case where the Jus-
tice Department exercised its authority involved FCC must-carry 
rules, requiring cable companies to carry local television signals. The 
Department perceived these rules as unconstitutional and refused, as 
the FCC had requested, to petition the Supreme Court to review the 
appellate court decision striking down these rules. 113 
FCC decisions to openly dispute Department of Justice positions 
with which it disagrees and .defend its declaratory orders as a matter 
of statutory right also match the structural paradigm. FCC v. Pacifica 
Foundation 116 and FCC v. MCI Telecommunications 117 typify such 
cases. In both instances, the FCC . and Solicitor General presented 
their divergent views as statutory respondents before the Supreme 
Court. In Pacifica, the FCC successfully argued that certain words 
could be kept off the airwaves for most broadcasting hours and 
thereby withstood the Solicitor General's challenge to the Fcc·order 
as overbroad because the Commission did not consider "the context 
in which the offending words were used." 118 MCI concerned an FCC 
order establishing that AT&T had no obligation to interconnect its 
facilities with those of MCI. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in-
validated this order. The FCC then petitioned for certiorari and the 
Solicitor General filed a petition in opposition. 119 Certiorari was de-
nied, 120 yet the case is noteworthy because of a biting footnote in the 
FCC brief "question[ing] exactly what interests of the United States 
the Solicitor legitimately represents in this case."121 This statement of 
outrage is indicative of the power of independent litigating authority. 
On several occasions, however, the structural paradigm has given 
way to the give and take of politics as well as competing visions of the 
114 Fred Barbash, High Court Rules for Public TV; Right to Comment Upheld Despite Fed-
eral Funding, WASH. PosT, July 3, 1984, at A1 (quoting FCC general counsel Bruce Fein). 
113 See Government Won't Appeal Must Carry, BROADCASTING, Mar. 28, 1988, at 37. 
116 438 u.s. 726 (1978). 
117 561 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1977), enforced in 580 F.2d 590 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 
439 u.s. 980 (1978). 
118 Brief for the United States at 14, FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (No. 77-
528). But see Petitioner's Reply Brief at 8, Pacifica Found. (No. 77-528) ("The [FCC] order 
seeks to protect parental and privacy interests ... to the extent that this Court's constitutional 
opinions permit.") (footnote omitted). 
119 See Brief for the United States in Opposition, United States lndep. Tel. Ass'n v. United 
States and MCI Telecommunications Corp., 439 U.S. 980 (1978) (No. 78-216); Petitioner's 
Reply to "Brief for the United States in Opposition," FCC v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 
439 U.S. 980 (1978) (No. 78-270). 
12o FCC v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 561 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1977), enforced in 580 
F.2d 590 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 980 (1978). 
121 Petitioner's Reply to "Brief for the United States in Opposition" at 1 n.1, FCC v. MCI 
Telecommunications Corp., 439 U.S. 980 (1978) (No. 78-270). 
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unitary executive. This is especially evident in licensing decisions, 
cases where the FCC controls litigation in the lower courts and the 
Solicitor General controls Supreme Court adjudication. This division 
of litigation responsibility enables the Solicitor General to reverse 
FCC positions before the Supreme Court. In the EEOC context, 
where a similar division of responsibility exists; the Solicitor General 
now views such conflicts as intraexecutive matters appropriately re-
solved by his office. The Solicitor General did precisely that in Sheet 
Metal Workers. 122 The FCC, indisputably an independent agency, 
presents a more complicated scenario. Moreover, the FCC is statuto-
rily authorized to present its views before the Supreme Court in de-
claratory order cases. 
Bureaucratic theory would resolve this conflict by having the So-
licitor General view the FCC as a client in need of representation. 
The Carter administration adopted tliis model to resolve a dispute 
between the Justice Department and the FCC over Commission rules 
governing the cross ownership of television stations and newspapers 
in a single market. Specifically, the 'FCC represented its own interests 
before the Court while the Solicitor General filed a separate brief "on 
behalf of the United States."123 Proponents of the unitary executive, 
in contrast, would view the Solicitor General's loyalties and obliga-
tions as running exclusively to the White House. Under this view, the 
independent agency's authority should be set aside in favor of execu-
tive branch interests, exercised through the Solicitor General. This is 
exactly what occurred in Sheet Metal Workers and iil several other 
cases involving independent agencies. 
The extent to which the Solicitor General will oppose FCC and 
other independent agency decisions is a question of political will. 
Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 124 decided by the Supreme Court in 1990, 
exemplifies the difficulty of the Justice Department's steadfast adher-
ence to unitariness. Metro Broadcasting called into question the con-
stitutionality of FCC efforts to increase the number of minority 
broadcasters through preference and set-aside programs. The case 
was a political battlefield because Congress had statutorily mandated 
the FCC to defend its preference, policy in the wake of Reagan FCC 
122 See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text . 
. 123 See Brief for Petitioner, FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Coinm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 755 
(1978) (No. 76-1471). The Department of Justice's views were presented in a separate brief. 
See Brief for the United States, Nat'/ Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting (No. 76-1471). For 
further discussion of this conflict, see FCC Cross-Media Ban Backed, FACTS ON FILE WORLD 
NEWS DIGEST, June 23, 1978, at A3. - . 
124 497 u.s. 547 (1990). 
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efforts to reexamine these affirmative action programs. 125 The FCC, 
therefore, could not argue in its own name that its preference scheme 
was constitutionally suspect. Further complicating this highly visible 
litigation was Bush Solicitor General Kenneth Starr's commitment to 
Reagan administration challenges to affirmative action. The initial 
resolution was for the FCC and Solicitor General to jointly oppose 
the grant of certiorari. 126 This effort, as the certiorari petition stated, 
was designed to throw this political issue back to Congress, where 
legislation repealing the preference might be enacted, and the D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeals, where an apparent intracircuit conflict 
might resolve itself through new judicial appointees. 127 It would also 
enable the Solicitor General to avoid the issue of whether to allow the 
FCC to independently assert its position before the Court. 128 Finally, 
for supporters of preferences within the FCC and Solicitor General's 
office, this strategy would keep the Court from placing another nail in 
the affirmative action coffin. 129 
Certiorari was granted, however. The Solicitor General prepared 
to file a brief challenging the constitutionality of FCC preferences but 
the question remained as to whether the FCC should be allowed to file 
separately. By this time, the Commission, thanks to three proprefer-
ence Commissioners named by President Bush, strongly supported 
the preference program. 130 
These Commissioners, in fact, sought to strong-arm the Justice 
Department in Metro Broadcasting, arguing that they would file their 
own brief before the Court with or without the Solicitor's authoriza-
tion.131 Bush's appointment of propreference Commissioners while 
he steadfastly encouraged his Justice Department to oppose racial 
preferences is certainly contradictory and created a great dilemma for 
a Solicitor General seeking to advance presidential interests. The ulti-
mate resolution allowed the FCC to independently (and successfully) 
defend its preferences before the Court, with the Solicitor filing an 
amicus brief setting forth the executive's opposition to the FCC pol-
icy.132 The Solicitor's interest in opposing preferences in Metro 
Broadcasting was as strong as it had beenin Sheet Metal Workers. 
12s See Neal Devins, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Requiem fora Heavyweight, 69 TEX. 
L. REV. 125 (1990). 
126 See Brief for the Federal Respondent in Opposition, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 
497 U.S. 547 (1990) (No. 89-453). 
127 See id. 
128 Interview with Tom Merrill, former Deputy Solicitor General (Sept. 16, 1992). 
129 /d. 
130 See Devins, supra note 125, at 152-53. 
131 Interview with Tom Merrill, former Deputy Solicitor General (Sept. 16, 1992). 
132 See Brief for the FCC, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (No. 89-
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The FCC's threat to the Solicitor General's statutory authority also 
raised the symbolic costs of acquiescence. In the end, however, the 
unitary executive and ideological opposition to race preferences gave 
way to political reality. 
The question of why Bush would create this dilemma through his 
FCC appointments remains. Against the backdrop of ongoing battles 
between Reagan FCC appointees and the Congress, Bush's action ap-
pears politically expedient. 133 Reagan appointed FCC commissioners 
who were committed to "unregulation,"134 caricatured the Commis-
sion as one of the "last of the New Deal dinosaurs,'' 135 and viewed 
their jobs "as an important part of carrying out [the Reagan] mandate 
for a leaner, less intrusive federal presence throughout this coun-
try. " 136 Congressional overseers, instead, admonished the Commis-
sioners to follow their lead since they "take an oath to regulate, not 
dereglilate." 137 These competing philosophies resulted in an all out 
war-FCC appointees thought it "[im]possible to carry out the Rea-
gan program and have amicable relations with Congress";138 over-
sight committee members thought "there [was] no way to 'overly 
manage the commission,' " 139 for the FCC was "a renegade 
agency" 140 that needed Congress to step in as an "active partici-
pant"141 and "bring them back."142 Congress's bite was as good as its 
bark: it enacted legislation at odds with Commission policy, including 
funding bans freezing deregulatory initiatives and blocking Reagan's 
appointment power by refusing to confirm FCC appointees for Rea-
gan's last two years in office. 143 For its part, the FCC antagonized 
Congress by, among other things, repealing the fairness doctrine and 
raising doubts about the propriety of several other congressionally 
453); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Metro Broadcasting, 
Inc. (No. 89-453). 
133 See generally Devins, supra note 18. 
134 MarkS. Fowler, The Federal Communications Commission 1981-1987: What the Chair-
man Said, 10 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. LJ. 409, 414 (1988). 
13S /d. at 411. 
136 Id. at 410. 
137 Congress Asserts its Dominion Over FCC, BROADCASTING, Aug. 7, 1989, at 27 (quoting 
Commerce Committee Chairman Ernest Hollings). 
138 Micromanagement of the FCC: Here to Stay?, BROADCASTING, Dec. 26, 1988, at 56, 57 
(quoting FCC Chairman Mark Fowler). 
·139 /d. at 56 (quoting Larry Irving, Senior Counsel to the House Telecommunications 
Subcommittee). 
140 /d. (quoting David Leach, communications advisor to the House Energy and Commerce 
Committee Chairman John Dingell). 
141 /d. (quoting Congressman Edward Markey, Chairman of the House Telecommunica-
tions Subcommittee). 
14 2 /d. (quoting Tom Cohen, Senior Counsel to the Senate Commerce Committee). 
143 See Devins, supra note 18. 
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supported regulatory programs. 144 
The battle over race preference exemplifies the bitterness of FCC-
Congress relations. When the Commission launched its reexamina-
tion of race preferences, it specifically requested comments on 
"whether the [FCC] is bound by, or may rely upon[,] Congressional 
findings of constitutionality."145 Congress viewed this request as an 
FCC attempt to "put itself above the Congress."146 Congress's out-
rage was dramatically expressed at oversight hearings, subsequent to 
the announced reexamination. Congressman John Bryant (D-Tex.) 
characterized working with the Commission as "almost pointless"; 147 
Congressman Mickey Leland (D:..Tex.) referred to the need to draft 
"FCC proof"148 legislation as well as the need to "fight this Commis-
sion tooth and nail"; 149 and Congressmap Edward Markey (D-Mass.) 
labelled the reexamination "a cloudburst in a storm of suspicion and 
distrust which seems to hover over this commission.mso To stop the 
FCC reexamination in its tracks, Congress prohibited the FCC from 
e~pending any funds on the reexamination. 151 
2. Comparing t~e FCC to the EEOC 
Congress was a formidable opponent of the FCC. In contrast to 
the EEOC where congressional threats could be dismissed, Congress 
took a proprietary interest in the FCC. The Commission's independ-
ent status was not simply symbolic protection from an aggressive ex-
ecutive; it was a license for Congress to exert its will upon FCC policy 
making. m For the 'Bush administration, telecommunications policy 
hinged on the reestablishment of a dialogue between the FCC and 
Congress. Bush sought to achieve this objective in many ways, in-
cluding his sacrifice of ideological consistency on affirmative action. 
The Solicitor General could not ignore Bush administration efforts to 
normalize relations between Congress and the FCC. With the White 
144 See id. 
145 In re Reexamination of the Commission's Comparative Licensing, Distress Sales and 
Tax Certificate Policies Premised on Racial, Ethnic or Gender Classifications, 1 F.C.C.R. 
1315, l318'{Dec. 22, 1986). . 
146 133 CONG. REC. 85494 (daily ed. Apr. 24, 1987) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg). 
147 Minority-Owned Broadcast Stations: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunica-
tions. Consumer Protection, and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce on 
H.R. 5373, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1986). 
14 8 Id. at 20. 
149 Id. 
ISO /d. at 22. 
151 Pub. L. No. 100-202, 101_Stat. 1329-1332 (1987). 
152 See Miller, supra note 18; Devins: supra note 18; Richard E. Wiley, "Political" Influence 
at the FCC, 1988 DuKE L.J. 280. 
HeinOnline -- 15  Cardozo L. Rev.  305 1993 - 1994
1993] POLITICAL WILL AND THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE 305 
House both defending and opposing FCC preferences, it was appro-
priate that the Solicitor General too would sacrifice unitariness. 
Department of Justice-FCC relations stand in dramatic contrast 
to Department of Justice-EEOC relations. The Justice Department, 
rather than endeavor to persuade the FCC that the government 
should speak the unitary voice of the Justice Department, empowered 
the FCC to speak its own voice. Indeed, not only were there no sug-
gestions of the Justice Department seeking to assume FCC authority, 
the FCC was the entity that sought to assume power as a matter of 
right. Since both sets of conflicts involved race preference, the Justice 
Department's assumption of power'in one case, -an<;I·concession of 
power in the other, is all the more staggering. · 
Structural differe11:ces provide limited insight in explaining why 
the FCC fared so much better than the EEOC. Although the FCC is 
more insulated from the executive than the EEOC, and possesses 
quasi-legislative and quasi-adjudicatory powers, statuiory grants of 
independent litigating authority favored the EEOC in Williams and 
went against the. FCC in Metro Broadcasting. The principal difference 
between the EEOC and FCC, instead, appears to be the political will 
and culture of political expectations. Williams was a severe threat to 
the Justice Department's authority, .with the Civil Rights Division 
having exclusive control over state and local cases. Metro Broadcast-
ing did not directly implicate the Justice Department's authority. 
Congress's indifference to the EEOC's location in government and un-
willingness to protect the E~OC also contributed to Department ac-
tion in Williams. With respect to the FCC, Congress was an 
extremely active and extraordinarily territorial player. Indeed, it ef-
fectively forced the FCC to defend racial preferences through appro-
priations legislation and political pressures on the Bush White House. 
Bush's naming of propreference Commissioners, moreover, signalled 
the Justice Departm~nt to leave the FCC alone in Metro Broadcasting. 
In sharp contrast, the White House, in Williams, set up a meeting to 
pressure EEOC officials to comply with Department o~ Justice argu-
ments. That the EEOC complied reveals another difference between 
Williams and Metro Broadcasting. The EEOC lacked a strong sense 
of its institutional identity. It linked itself to the executive in 1978 
and could not easily toss aside those shackles in 1983. However, the 
FCC has always understood itself to be an independent agency. 
Politics more than structure explains Metro Broadcasting as well 
as the differences between the FCC and EEOC. The failure of the 
government to speak a unitary voice in Metro Broadcasting also 
reveals that political compromise makes policy coordination espe-
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cially difficult. Opposition to race preference did not lie at the heart 
of the Bush administration's telecommunications policy and conse-
quently was easily sacrificed. Political tradeoff's, however, are anath-
ema to unitary approaches. To the extent that political tradeoff's are 
inevitable, unitariness may well prove to be an elusive objective. 
3. The Postal Service 
The Postal Service operates as an "independent establishment of 
the executive branch."153 The Board of Governors of the Postal Ser-
vice, whose statutory charge is to "represent the public interest gener-
ally ... not ... specific interests[,]"154 controls the Postal Service. 
Eleven voting governors serve staggered nine-year terms to ensure 
that no President can appoint more than four in a single term. Gover-
nors elect their own chair and appoint two of their own members-
the Postmaster General and Deputy Postmaster General. The Presi-
dent's power is further weakened by the statutory requirement that no 
more than five (of the nine) presidential appointees can be "adherents 
of the same political party."155 Most significant, the President can 
only remove governors "for cause." 156 
The Postal Service has some independent litigating authority, 
although the statutory division between the Department of Justice 
and Postal Service is murky. On rate-making disputes, the Postal Ser-
vice has clear statutory authority to separate itself from the Justice 
Department and act independently in court. 157 On other matters, the 
statutory language is less clear. While requiring Attorney General 
consent to Postal Service litigation, 158 the Department of Justice pro-
vides the Postal Service with legal representation as it may require, 
and legislation requires that such legal representation be "deem[ ed] 
appropriate" by the Service. 159 
Independent litigating authority in rate-making cases is critically 
important to the Service. Rate-making disputes pit the Postal Service 
against the Postal Rate Commission, an independent agency whose 
153 39 u.s.c. § 201 (1988). 
ts4 39 U.S.C. § 202(a) (1988). 
iSS Jd. 
156 /d. 
157 39 u.s.c. §§ 3625, 3628 (1988); 28 u.s.c. § 2348 (1988). 
!58 39 u.s.c. § 409(d) (1988). 
159 39 U.S.C. § 411 (1988); 39 U.S. C.§ 409(d) (1988). Court interpretations of§ 409(d) are 
in conflict. Some support Postal Service control while others support Department of Justice 
control. Compare Leonard v. United States Postal Serv., 489 F.2d 814 (5th Cir. 1974) (sup-
porting Postal Service authority) with Friedlander v. United States Postal Serv., 658 F. Supp. 
95 (D.D.C. 1987) (supporting Justice Department authority). 
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litigation is entrusted to the Attorney General. 160 Specifically, when 
the Postal Service disagrees with Rate Commission decision making, 
it may either reject the decision outright or accept the decision under 
protest and then challenge it in court. 161 Under this scheme, courts 
serve as arbitrators of Service-Commission disputes in rate-making 
cases. Were the Attorney General to control Service representation, 
he would serve as gatekeeper to such dispute resolution and thereby 
could rule in favor of the Commission simply by declining to repre-
sent the Service in rate-making disputes. 162 
Disputes between the Commission and Service do arise. The 
question left unanswered is what role the Attorney General should 
play in inserting executive branch interests into Service-Commission 
dispute resolution. Bureaucratic theory demands adherence to the 
statutory design and allows both sides to settle their differences in 
court. In most instances, this is precisely the course taken by the Jus-
tice Department. The Department would either allow both sides to 
represent themselves or would present the Service's position and at-
tach a memorandum setting forth the Commission's opposing view. 163 
Proponents of the unitary executive would follow a different 
course. Indeed, the congressionally envisioned scheme of two in-
dependent entities resolving their policy disputes through litigation 
titled United States Postal Service v. United States Postal Rate Com-
mission is antithetical to unitary executive branch control. That this 
scheme also presupposes dutiful Justice Department representation of 
one of its independent agency clients is doubly offensive. How the 
Department would exercise its disapproval is a bit more complex. 
When the disagreement is with the Rate Commission, the Depart-
ment can simply refuse to defend against the Postal Service action. 
On the other hand, when the disagreement is with the Service, the 
Department, aside from suggesting that the case is a nonjusticiable 
intragovernmental dispute, 164 can apparently do very little. 
160 The Commission, although designated an independent agency under 44 U.S.C. 
§ 3502(10) (1992), has no special statutory litigation authority and therefore must look to the 
Attorney General for representation. 
161 39 u.s.c. § 3625 (1988). 
t62 The specification of Attorney General control over Rate Commission litigation creates 
exactly this dilemma. The Attorney General, apparently, can undermine Rate Commission 
decision making by refusing to defend the Commission against a Service challenge. At the 
same time, statutory language authorizing Postal Service challenges to Commission rate mak-
ing arguably grant the Commission a right to independently defend their decision. 
163 See PRELIMINARY SURVEY, supra note 14, at 18. 
164 Courts thus far do not seem at all troubled about adjudicating disputes between the 
Service and the Commission. On the issue of intragovernmental litigation, see generally 
Michael Herz, United States v. United States: When Can the Federal Government Sue Itself?, 
32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 893 (1991). 
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Not so. On September 25, 1992, the Justice Department advised 
the Postal Service that it could not represent itself in Governors of the 
United States Postal Service v. Postal Rate Commission, an ongoing 
Service-Commission rate-making dispute. 16' The Department argued 
that it should broker disputes between the Postal Service and the Rate 
Commission. 166 The Department of Justice's effort to become the 
government's unitary voice on postal rule making failed. On Novem-
ber 9, the Service filed its brief for the cases. The Justice Department 
was undeterred, filing a conflicting brief on behalf of the Postal Ser-
vice. 167 At this point, the Justice Department sought to judicially 
challenge the Postal Service's authority to litigate this dispute on its 
own behalf. Like its efforts to flush the EEOC out of the Williams 
litigation, however, Justice first sought to accomplish its objectives 
through political means. Specifically, on December 11, 1992, George 
Bush sent a memorandum to Postmaster General Marvin Runyon 
"direct[ing]" the Postal Service to withdraw from its ongoing judicial 
dispute with the Rate Commission. 168 This presidential "directive" 
was undertaken "pursuant to [his] authority as Chief Executive and 
[his] obligation to take care that the laws are faithfully executed."169 
On the same day, the Justice Department filed a letter with the D.C. 
Circuit declaring that "the controversy has been resolved" and that 
the unauthorized filings of the Postal Service "will be withdrawn." 170 
Three weeks later, on the very day that the Board of Governors was 
to vote on whether to comply with the directive, the President sent a 
letter to each governor threatening that if his directive was not com-
plied with "[he would] if necessary exercise [his] authority to remove 
governors of the Postal Service."171 
16S See Motion of the United States Postal Service for Leave to Appear as a Party on its 
Own Behalf at 3, Mail Order Ass'n of America v. United States Postal Serv., 986 F.2d 509 
(D.C. Cir. 1993) (No. 91-1058); Mail Order Ass'n, 986 F.2d at 511. The Postal Service dispute 
with the Commission spawned two separate lawsuit~ne suit involved a Postal Service chal-
lenge to the Commission, and the second suit concerned a private mailer challenge to the 
Service's opposition to Commission decision making. The Justice Department brief was filed 
in the second suit. The two suits were linked in the Postal Service's motion for self-
representation. 
166 /d. 
167 The Justice Department brief endorsed Rate Commission decision making over Postal 
Service objections. Technically, the Rate Commission was not a party to the matter briefed by 
the Justice Department. 
168 Memorandum from President George Bush to Postmaster General Marvin Runyon 
(Dec. 11, 1992) (on file with the author). 
169 /d. 
170 Letter from Jacob M. Lewis, Civil Division Attorney, to Ron Garvin, Clerk, U.S. Court 
of Appeals .for the D.C. Circuit (Dec. 11, 1992) (on file with the author). 
171 Letter from President George Bush to Bert Mackie, Governor, U.S. Postal Service (Jan. 
4, 1993) (on file with the author). 
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These White House and Justice Department ~maneuverings were 
truly extraordinary. The President's assertion that he could "direct" 
Postal Service decision making was squarely grounded in his author-
ity as "Chief Executive" over a unitary government. This bold asser-
tion was the only option available to the President. The 
acknowledgement of Postal Service independence would have kept 
the issue in court where the Justice Department and Postal Service 
were prepared to battle over the Service's litigation authority. This 
was a dispute that the Justice Department was unlikely to win. The 
constitutionality of statutory grants of litigating authority to entities 
outside the President's control appears beyond question. 172 In other 
words, as was probably the case with Williams, the only way for the 
Executive to win this battle was to place political pressure on the Pos-
tal Service. 
The Postal Service, however, is far more independent than the 
EEOC with respect both to structure and political expectations. Is-
sues of concurrent jurisdiction and the intermingling of functions do 
not beset the Postal Service as they do the EEOC. Unlike the EEOC, 
moreover, the Postal Service performs quasi-legislative and quasi-ad-
judicatory tasks. In fact, the President is more constrained in his con-
trol of the Postal Service than of the FCC. The Board of Governors 
select their chair as well as the Postmaster and Deputy Postmaster 
Generals, the two officials principally responsible for the Service's 
day-to-day operations. 173 With the Postmaster and Deputy Postmas-
ter Generals voting on most Board matters, 174 the President's direct 
influence over the Board is further diminished. 
Congressional expectations of Postal. Service independence also 
distinguish the Postal Service from the EEOC. In 1970, the Postal 
Service was, in the words of then President Richard Nixon, removed 
from the President's cabinet and made an "independent establishment 
. . . freed from direct political pressures:ms To ensure "in-
dependen[ce] of ordinary legislative and executive supervision and 
172 See Olson, supra note 7; Attorney General as Chief Litigator, supra note 12; Devins, 
supra note 12. At the same time, Justice Department claims that the Postal Service was with-
out statutory authority to represent its interests in court-although ultimately unsuccessful-
were not without force. See Neal Devins, Tempest in an Envelope: Reflections on the Bush 
White House's Failed Takeover of the U.S. Postal Service, 41 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming 
Apr. 1994). · 
173 Presidentially appointed governors serve in a part·time capacity, typically only a few 
days each month. 
174 Rate-making decisions ~e exclusively within the province of the Board. 
175 The President's Message to the Congress Recommending Postal Reorganization and 
Pay Legislation, 6 WEEKLY CoMP. PRES. Doc. 532, 533 (Apr. 16, 19!0). 
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control,"176 as the Senate Report put it, the Board of Governors was 
exempted from "Federal laws ... which in most instances apply to 
Government agencies and functions." 177 The House Report likewise 
noted that the 1970 Reorganization "seals off the Postal Service from 
political influence ... by establishing institutional buffers between the 
President and the Congress .... " 178 Congress then envisioned a Pos-
tal Service with greater independence from outside control than either 
the EEOC or FCC. The 1970 Postal Reorganization, unlike the exec-
utive initiated and legislatively approved 1978 EEOC Reorganization, 
removed the Postal Service and its functions from partisan influence. 
The Postal Service response to the President's directive matched 
its structure and political expectations. Although nearly breaking in 
the face of intense White House pressure, the Service ultimately held 
its own. By a 6-5 vote, the Board of Governors refused to withdraw 
its self-representation motion.t'9 Instead, on January 7, 1993, the 
noncomplying governors successfully sought a preliminary injunction 
against the President, blocking their threatened removal. 180 More-
over, before the President could successfully stack the governors in 
his favor with a questionable recess appointment, 181 the D.C. Circuit 
heard arguments on Postal Service self-representation (on January 14) 
and decided (on January 15) that the Postal Service had a right to 
have its views aired on rate-making matters. 182 
The failure of the White House's unitariness campaign in this 
instance is due to both structure and politics. Structural limitations 
on the President's removal authority, the absence of any presidential 
role in selecting two governors (the Postmaster General and Deputy 
176 POSTAL REORGANIZATION, S. REP. No. 912, 9lst Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1970). 
177 !d. at 5. 
178 POSTAL REORGANIZATION AND SALARY ADJUSTMENT ACT OF 1970, H.R. REP. No. 
1104, 9lst Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1970). 
179 See Bill McAllister, Divided Postal Board Seeks to Forestall Firings, WASH. PosT, Jan. 6, 
1993, at A IS; Michael York, Bush Blocked from Firing Postal Board, WASH. PosT, Jan. 8, 
1993, at AI. The vote was 7-4 but one of the majority Governors changed his vote the day 
after the original vote. 
180 See York, supra note 179. 
181 See Michael York & Stephen Barr, Bush Appoints Supporter in Postal Board Dispute, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 9, 1993, at Al. The suspect nature of this recess appointment is revealed in 
a letter sent by Senate leaders to President Bush, as well as in papers filed by Postal Service 
Governors in court. See Letter from George Mitchell et al. to President George Bush (Jan. 12, 
1993) (on file with author); Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff's 
Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order, Bert H. Mackie et al. v. George Bush and Thomas 
Ludlow Ashley, Civ. No. 93-0032-LFO (Jan. 15, 1993). On July 24, 1993, D.C. District Judge 
John Oberdorfer invalidated the recess appointment. Bill McAllister, Bush's Recess Appoint-
ment Voided, WASH. PoST, July 26, 1993, at AIS. 
182 See Bill McAllister, Appeals Court Rejects Bush's Assertion of Control Over Postal Ser-
vice, WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 1993, at A6. 
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Postmaster General), and a statutory grant of ind,ependent litigating 
authority, bolstered the Postal Service position. The closeness of the 
governors' vote, however, reveals that the President was nearly suc-
cessful despite these structural constraints. In fact, a majority of five 
of the nine presidentially-appointed governors voted to comply with 
the directive. 183 A majority of six of the eleven governors, moreover, 
would have voted to follow the directive had the President filled a 
vacancy on the Board of Governors in a timely fashion. 184 
The Bush administration's failure to succeed in the Postal Ser-
vice dispute is largely attributable to poor political judgment. The 
President should not have waited until a crisis emerged before he 
sought to fill a Board vacancy. This sluggishness certainly limited his 
influence over the governors. Even more striking was the horrendous 
timing of the President's directive. Rather than lay the foundation for 
its opposition to independent Postal Service advocacy at roughly the 
time that the Service filed its claim, the administration waited almost 
twenty months before launching its offensive. The D.C. Circuit ex-
pressed disapproval of this foot dragging in an order on December 8, 
1992, and it is unlikely that these stall tactics enamored the Service's 
Board of Governors. 185 
The Bush directive also came a month after his electoral defeat. 
The brevity of his remaining time in office certainly cabined the Presi-
dent's ability to work his political will. For example, if the President 
had more time, he could have engaged the governors in some type of 
dialogue before resorting to the threat of removal. By threatening re-
moval and naming a recess appointee in his last days in office, the 
White House action was the subject of sharp attack in the press and in 
Congress. 186 Whether this political firestorm enhanced Postal Service 
resistance or made the D.C. Circuit skeptical of Department of Jus-
tice arguments is hard to know; what is clear is that this political 
firestorm did not help the President. 
The Postal Service dispute, like the EEOC and FCC disputes, is 
one of politics. Structure, undoubtedly, also played a tremendous role 
in shaping the tugs and pulls between the Postal Service and the 
183 A fifth governor, Tirso Del Junco, voted to follow the directive on January 7, 1993. 
McAllister, supra note 179. 
184 This assertion assumes that in the fall of 1992, the President would have appointed and 
the Senate confirmed a governor willing to comply with the directive. 
tss Mail Order Assoc. of Amer. v. Postal Serv., 986 F.2d 509, 512 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
186 See Letter to the President from George Mitchell et al. (Jan. 12, 1993) (on file with 
author); Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home; Two Cents Plain, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1993, at 
A17; Tempest in an Envelope, WASH. PosT, Jan. 9, 1993, at A20. · 
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White House. Yet,· the stocy of Postal Service independence turns on 
the effective exercise of political will-or its absence. 
Ill. CONCLUSION 
The paradigm of agency independence which naturally follows 
from these case studies holds interesting implications for all types of 
federal agencies. It suggests that agency independence is necessarily 
qualified. Independence from the executive may mean dependence 
upon the Congress. Furthermore, independence from the executive, 
may be temporal-depending on shifting White House attitudes to-
wards unitariness or cqmpeting policy demands that yield disunitari-
ness in interpretation. 
The EEOC example should serve as a warning to independent 
federal agencies that their ability to assert their independence is by no 
means secure. While few agencies will face the identity crisis that the 
EEOC did, the EEOC case suggests that even those agencies that feel 
generally secure in their independent status may on occasion be un-
able to voice that independence if faced with an executive assertion of 
power and a congressional failure to act. 
The FCC and Postal Service examples, in contrast, point to lim-
its on the executive's ability to speak a unitary voice. The FCC over-
came structural limitations and asserted its own position in Metro 
Broadcasting thanks to competing policy agendas within the Bush 
White House. The Postal Service withstood a furious White House 
effort to sap its independent litigating authority because the Presi-
dent's plan was unsystematic in design and frantic in its execution. 
The sagas of the EEOC, FCC, and Postal Service indicate that 
agency independence is a fluid and slippery thing. Certainly, struc-
tural analysis of federal agencies fails to do justice to the power of 
politics and the politics of power. These studies suggest a model of 
agency analysis which emphasizes the complex dynamics that charac-
terize the administrative state. 
